Tommy Angello
Administrateur
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Inscrit le: 05 Sep 2006
Messages: 4354
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Posté le: Mer Nov 24, 2010 22:17 pm Sujet du message:
Si j'était toi, c'est pas de l'iran que j'aurais peur.
| les yeux du monde a
écrit: | En 2008, la Corée du
Nord démantelait un site suspecté, par les autorités américaines, de
devenir un lieu d’enrichissement d’uranium, à Yongbyon. Ce mois-ci, à
l’inverse, ce même site a été dévoilé par le régime nord-coréen comme
abritant effectivement des infrastructures à la pointe de la technologie
permettant de l’uranium enrichi. Selon la Corée du Nord, les 2000
centrifugeuses de ce site produiraient d’ores et déjà de l’uranium
enrichi à un taux de 3,5% et à des fins simplement civiles. En effet, cet
uranium devrait permettre de faire fonctionner une centrale électrique, alors
que le pays est au plus mal. Mais cela n’est en pratique pas vérifiable,
puisque les agents de l’Agence International de l’Energie Atomique (AIEA)
ont été expulsés de Corée du Nord en 2009.
Pourtant, selon Siegfried Hecker, scientifique américain qui a été invité
par le régime de Kim Jong-Il à visiter ce site nucléaire, ce programme
révèle la capacité nord-coréenne à produire de l’uranium enrichi à un
taux de 90%, taux nécessaire à la fabrication d’une bombe atomique, ce qui
est tout sauf rassurant. Notons que les deux engins atomiques qu’avait fait
exploser la Corée du Nord jusque-là n’étaient qu’à base de plutonium.
Immédiatement, les Etats-Unis ont dénoncé une attitude « belliqueuse »,
et le Japon a également vivement réagi alors que son voisin sud-coréen
s’inquiète au plus haut point de voir son voisin avoir de tels moyens en sa
possession. L’émissaire américain pour la Corée du Nord, qui a quant à
lui tenu à relativiser ce qu’il considère n’être qu’une nouvelle
provocation, s’est immédiatement rendu en Corée du Sud afin de relancer
les négociations à six (Etats-Unis, Japon, Corée du Sud, Chine, Russie et
Corée du Nord), gelées depuis avril 2009.
La question est désormais de savoir comment la Corée du Nord a pu se
procurer les technologies et matériaux nécessaires à la création de ce
site. Selon un rapport d’un institut américain d’octobre, la Chine, qui
considère la Corée du Nord comme un élément de possible déstabilisation
régionale mais dont l’attitude reste floue, pourrait être le lieu de
passage de ces matériaux. Déjà, le Pakistanais Abdul Qadir Khan avait
avoué avoir vendu des secrets technologiques à la Corée du Nord. Le pays
aurait pu se fournir les divers matériaux sur le marché noir ou obtenir
l’aide de l’Iran, qui tente également de développer un programme
nucléaire. Quoiqu’il en soit, il est quasi-évident que la Corée du Nord a
reçu une aide extérieure, et il est urgent de surveiller davantage les
échanges de matériaux nécessaires à la construction d’une centrale
nucléaire, sans quoi sa prolifération pourrait s’intensifier au risque de
voir certains pays peu stables se doter d’armes
atomiques… |
pour en savoir plus
| globalsecurity.org a
écrit: | North Korea had several nuclear facilities that,
collectively, had the potential to produce nuclear fuel for weapons. Most were
located at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang, which had an estimated staff
of some 2,000. The major installations included a 5-megawatt electric (MW(e))
research reactor, a larger a 50-MW(e) reactor that was under construction in
Yongbyon, and a plutonium reprocessing facility. Yongbyon was also the site of
the Radiochemical Laboratory of the Institute of Radiochemistry, the Nuclear
Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant, and a storage facility for fuel rods.
Under the cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, in
1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965
through 1973 fuel elements enriched to 10 percent were supplied to the DPRK
for this reactor. In 1974, Korean specialists independently modernized this
reactor bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched
to 80 percent.
Since nuclear development began in earnest in the 1980s, the college of
physics and technical college of physics were set up at Yongbyon to train
specialists necessary for the operation of nuclear facilities like the atomic
reactor at Yongbyon, the nuclear fuel re-processing plant and nuclear fuel
manufacturing plant.
In March 1986, satellite imagery of Yongbyon depicted small craters in the
sand near a river bank, apparently from experimental high-explosive
detonations. At that time a study earlier imagery showed similar craters in
the same area since 1983. In June 1988, satellite imagery reportedly indicated
craters at a detonation test site used to develop high explosive implosion
techniques for nuclear weapons located near the Kuryong-gang River [ie,
Kuryong-gang 39°44'"N 125°49'"E]. By 1991, South Korean sources estimated
that North Korea had conducted approximately 70 explosions at a test site
located along the banks of the aka Yuryong river (south of Yongdong).
The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK entered into force on 10
April 1992, permitting verification that all nuclear material and all nuclear
facilities in the DPRK were used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
assessment of whether the initial declaration of material and facilities was
complete and correct.
On 4 May 1992, North Korea submitted its declaration of nuclear materials to
IAEA, as required by IAEA's safeguards agreements. According to the
declaration, North Korea had 7 sites and about 90 grams of plutonium in its
possession that were subject to IAEA's inspections. According to North Korea,
the nuclear material resulted from its reprocessing of 89 defective fuel rods
in 1989.
In July 1992, an IAEA inspection team collected information that subsequently
resulted in the disclosure of discrepancies in North Korea's declaration of
nuclear materials. Instead of reprocessing spent fuel from 89 damaged fuel
rods on just one occasion, IAEA concluded that North Korea had probably
reprocessed spent fuel on 3-4 occasions since 1989. Additional inspections
revealed further inconsistencies in North Korea's declaration.
These inconsistencies between the DPRK's declaration of nuclear material and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) findings led the Agency to conclude
that undeclared plutonium had to exist in the DPRK, whether in grams or
kilograms. Three separate, but possibly interrelated elements were the object
of the Agency's special interest: firstly, 2 sites that were apparently
related to nuclear waste that could provide evidence of reprocessing
activities in the DPRK; secondly, the core of the 5 MW(e) Experimental Nuclear
Power Reactor, the history of which could shed light on the extent of any
possible reprocessing; and thirdly the DPRK's reprocessing plant, called the
Radiochemical Laboratory, and the use that had been made of it.
Late in 1992, the IAEA informally requested that it be given access to 2
additional sites, located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, that it suspected
of housing nuclear waste. North Korea allowed IAEA to visually inspect one of
the sites, but denied any access to the other. On 9 February 1993, IAEA
invoked the "special inspections clause" of its safeguards agreement with
North Korea, indicating that it wanted to inspect 2 sites that North Korea had
not declared and that IAEA suspected had a bearing on the history of North
Korea's nuclear program. North Korea denied IAEA access to the 2 undeclared
sites. North Korea said that the sites were military installations with no
connection to its nuclear program.
At a 22 February 1993 meeting of the IAEA board, the members were shown US
overhead surveillance photographs and a chemical analysis of data collected by
IAEA inspectors. The evidence reportedly confirmed the existence of a nuclear
waste dump, long denied by North Korea, and disclosed discrepancies in North
Korea's declaration of the nuclear materials in its possession. On 12 March
1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, effective 12 June 1993. The announcement elevated
what was viewed as a serious proliferation threat into a major diplomatic
confrontation between the United States and North Korea.
On 15 February 1994, after lengthy talks with the IAEA, a detailed
understanding was reached with the IAEA about conducting inspections that the
Agency requested, with the exception of the 2 non-declared, apparently waste
related sites. IAEA resumed inspections between 3 and 14 March 1994. The
inspectors proceeded without incident at several locations but encountered
problems at the reprocessing plant, where they were precluded from entering
certain portions of the plant and performing activities, such as taking
samples from reprocessing equipment and conducting a gamma ray scan of the
reprocessing facility, that North Korea had agreed to on 15 February 1994. On
15 March 1994, IAEA terminated inspections after North Korea barred the
inspectors from taking samples at key locations in its plutonium reprocessing
plant. The March 1994 inspection reportedly indicated that North Korea had
resumed construction on the second reprocessing line in the facility,
constructed new connections between the old and new reprocessing lines, and
broken seals on previously tagged reprocessing equipment.
In early 1994, the American military prepared detailed plans for attacking the
Yongbyon facility with precision-guided munitions. The US was confident that
the reactor could be destroyed without causing a meltdown that would release
radioactivity into the area. The nearby buildings designed to reprocess the
reactor fuel into bomb material would also be leveled in the attack. The US
demonstrated a willingness to use military force by positioning forces to
strike Yongbyon and reinforcing military units that were deployed to defend
South Korea.
After further talks between DPRK and other States, the DPRK accepted Agency
inspection of the points earlier blocked. Following progress made during
bilateral consultations between DPRK and United States representatives, the
DPRK accepted enlarging the scope of inspections in early September 1994. The
IAEA inspectors were given access to the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant
and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Storage facility for periodic inspections, as
required by the IAEA. The inspectors were also enabled, in addition to the
other activities being carried out at the 5 MWe Reactor, to enter the reactor
fuel storage to verify the fresh fuel rod inventory. However, at the
Radiochemical Laboratory, the DPRK continued to refuse to allow the Agency
inspectors to ascertain the state of completion of the new process line under
construction there and declined examination of records and gamma-mapping
activities.
On 21 October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed in Geneva a
Framework Agreement to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Its main
provisions were that the North would freeze and eventually dismantle its
existing suspect nuclear program, including the 50 MW and 200 MW
graphite-moderated reactors under construction, as well as its existing 5 MW
reactor and nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. In return, Pyongyang would be
provided with 2 1,000 MW light-water nuclear reactors, which would be safer
and would produce much less plutonium (the key material for atomic weapons),
in order to help boost the supply of electricity in the North.
Under the "Agreed Framework" the DPRK agreed that there would be no operations
at the facilities covered by the freeze and no construction work of any kind,
either at existing facilities or new, related facilities; that the spent fuel
from the 5 MWe reactor would be stored and disposed of in a manner that did
not involve reprocessing in the DPRK; and that any movements of nuclear
material or equipment within those facilities, any necessary maintenance work
by the operator and any transfers of nuclear material out of the facilities
would have to be carried out under the observation of IAEA inspectors or under
other IAEA arrangements.
IAEA inspectors regularly monitored the 5-MW(e) reactor, the fuel fabrication
plant, and the reprocessing plant. IAEA used all technical means available to
monitor the freeze at these facilities, such as using seals that could
indicate instances of tampering, using video cameras, and making short-notice
inspections. The particular method(s) used depends on the circumstances at
each of the 3 facilities. The primary monitoring method was the use and
frequent verification of tamper-indicating seals on equipment and
installations throughout the "frozen" nuclear facilities. Video cameras were
also used for surveillance. Finally, short-notice inspections were used to
monitor certain equipment and areas in the frozen facilities that have not
been allowed to be sealed. IAEA inspectors also monitored activities related
to the canning and storage of spent fuel from the 5-MW(e) reactor and had,
through qualitative measurements of the fuel rods (spent fuel), verified
whether the rods were, in fact, irradiated (spent) fuel rods.
As of late 1999, United States experts remained on-site in North Korea working
to complete clean-up operations after largely finishing the canning of spent
fuel from the North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.
Through late 2002, the DPRK continued to maintain a freeze on its nuclear
facilities consistent with the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework. North Korea had
not allowed the IAEA to perform inspections sufficiently comprehensive at all
sites to verify the operating history of the 5-megawatt (electric) reactor,
the amount of reprocessing accomplished, and whether special nuclear materials
had been diverted to develop nuclear weapons.
Under strict adherence to the Agreed Framework, North Korea was required to
make its nuclear program completely transparent and had to allow the IAEA to
perform special inspections prior to the delivery of Nuclear Suppliers' Group
(NSG) controlled items to the Light Water Reactors. North Korea also had
obligated itself beyond its NPT and IAEA requirements by agreeing to eliminate
eventually all its existing or planned nuclear power and related facilities.
In early December 2002, North Korea received a shipment of 20 tons of the
specialty chemical tributyl phosphate (TBP) from a Chinese company in Dalian,
a Pacific coast port. The chemical shipment coincided with the announcement by
Pyongyang that it would restart its nuclear reactors in Yongbyon, and the TBP
could be used to extract material for nuclear bombs from North Korea's
stockpile of spent nuclear-reactor fuel.
By the end of 2002, North Korea said it was lifting the freeze on facilities
frozen under the agreed framework between the United States and North Korea,
including a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Furthermore, North Korea asked the
International Atomic Energy Agency to remove its cameras from the Yongbyon
facility. North Korea defied world opinion on 21 December 2002 by removing
United Nations seals and cameras at a nuclear power plant suspected of making
weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea tampered with surveillance devices the UN
nuclear watchdog installed at the Yongbyong complex. The agency said the North
cut most of the seals on equipment and tampered with cameras at the 5-megawatt
reactors. North Korea said the agency did not respond to Pyongyang's requests
that it remove the equipment. The International Atomic Energy Agency said it
was trying to keep communications open with Pyongyang. IAEA chief Mohamed
ElBaradei said it was deplorable North Korea had ignored requests for talks.
US Senator Joe Biden said he believed North Korea's restarting of the Yongbyon
nuclear reactor posed a greater threat than Iraq. He said within months
Pyongyang could have enough material for 5 more nuclear weapons. The incoming
chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Senator
Richard Lugar, said Washington had to actively engage its allies in the
region.
During a visit to Yongbyon on 8 January 2004, North Korea showed an unofficial
American delegation what it asserted was weapons-grade plutonium. The group
spent about a day at Yongbyon, and was shown the empty cooling pond where the
8,000 fuel rods from the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor had been stored. During
the visit, the reprocessing plant was operating.
The Six-Party plenary meeting held between 27 and 30 September 2007 resulted
in the 3 October 2007 agreement on "Second-Phase Actions for the
Implementation of the Joint Statement." Under the terms of the 3 October 2007
agreement, the DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject
to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the 13 February
2007 agreement. The parties agreed to complete by 31 December 2007, a set of
disablement actions for the 3 core facilities at Yongbyon, the 5-MW(e)
Experimental Reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory (Reprocessing Plant), and
the Fresh Fuel Fabrication Plant, with oversight from a team of US experts.
The DPRK also agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its
nuclear programs in accordance with the 13 February 2007 agreement by 31
December 2007 and reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials,
technology, or know-how.
In November 2007, the DPRK began to disable the 3 core facilities at Yongbyon
and completed most of the agreed disablement actions by the end of the year.
Due to health and safety concerns, disablement activities at the 5-MW(e)
reactor continued beyond 31 December 2007. Assistant Secretary of State
Christopher Hill visited Pyongyang again in December 2007 as part of ongoing
consultations on the implementation of Second-Phase actions and carried with
him a letter from the President of the United States to Kim Jong-il. The DPRK
missed the 31 December 2007 deadline to provide a complete and correct
declaration, but efforts to secure a declaration continued into January 2008.
While the DPRK missed the 31 December 2007 deadline to provide a complete and
correct declaration, it provided its declaration to the Chinese, chair of the
Six-Party Talks, on 26 June 2008. The DPRK also imploded the cooling tower at
the Yongbyon facility in late June 2008 before international media. Following
the DPRK's progress on disablement and provision of a declaration, President
Bush announced the lifting of the application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act (TWEA) with respect to the DPRK and notified Congress of his intent to
rescind North Korea's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
President Bush made clear that the United States needed to have a strong
regime in place to verify the DPRK's declaration before it removes the DPRK
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. As of August 2008, the United
States continued to work with its Six-Party partners to establish such a
verification regime, and remained prepared to move forward with taking the
DPRK off of the state sponsors of terrorism list once a verification regime
was in place. |
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